From Persecution to Management of Populations.  Governmentality and the Common European Asylum System by Guild, E.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/105845
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
  
NIJMEGEN MIGRATION 
LAW WORKING 
PAPERS SERIES 
 
 
2012/04 Elspeth Guild 
 
From Persecution to Management of 
Populations: Governmentality and 
the Common European Asylum 
System 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 2212-7526 
 
Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series 2012/04 
 
 
Centre for Migration Law  
Faculty of Law 
Radboud University Nijmegen 
P.O. Box 9049 
6500 KK Nijmegen 
The Netherlands 
 
 
Editors Carolus Grütters 
 Ashley Terlouw 
 
Lay-out Hannie van de Put 
 
Cover photo Erik van ’t Hullenaar 
 
 
© 2012, Elspeth Guild 
 
 
url: http://www.ru.nl/law/cmr/research/working-papers 
 
  
3 
 
FROM PERSECUTION TO MANAGEMENT OF POPULATIONS: 
GOVERNMENTALITY AND THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM 
SYSTEM 
 
 
Elspeth Guild* 
 
 
Abstract 
Refugee protection has long been an issue of great moral and legal importance among the 
countries in Europe. European states sent representatives to participate in the drafting of the 
UN Convention relating to the status of refugees 1951 together with its 1967 protocol – the 
international commitment to refugee protection and were among the first signatories. They 
have also been strong supporters of the UN Agency established as guardian of the Geneva 
Convention – the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and participate as 
members of the UNHCR’s Executive Committee. However, these same states, when adopting 
legislation on refugee protection in European Union law, appear Janus faced. On the one 
hand, statements of commitment to refugee protection are plentiful, on the other, mechanisms 
are adopted which aim to exclude the refugee even from being heard. In this article I will 
examine this contradiction using the concept of governmentality as developed by Michel Fou-
cault. Deploying the three techniques of governmentality which Foucault developed most – 
sovereignty, discipline and biopolitics – I seek to dissect the asylum protection system the EU is 
developing and make visible the underlying structure of authority and power. 
 
Key words 
Asylum; EU law; persecution; governmentality; biopolitics. 
Introduction 
Refugee protection has long been an issue of great moral and legal im-
portance among the countries in Europe. European states sent representatives 
to participate in the drafting of the UN Convention relating to the status of ref-
                                         
*  Jean Monnet Professor ad personam Radboud University Nijmegen, Queen Mary, Univer-
sity of London and Partner, Kingsley Napley, London, e.guild@jur.ru.nl.  
 This paper would not have been possible without the invaluable assistance and attention 
of Professor Didier Bigo an expert in Foucault’s work, who patiently discussed the key 
elements of Foucault’s thought with me and then, beyond any call of academic solidarity, 
read and commented in depth on earlier versions of this paper. My debt to him is very 
substantial indeed. Many thanks also to Dr Philippe Bonditti and Dr Andrew Neal for 
their very useful comments on an earlier draft which assisted me greatly in clarifying my 
own views on Foucault’s work. All the errors rest exclusively my own. 
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ugees 1951 together with its 1967 protocol (the Geneva Convention)1 – the 
international commitment to refugee protection and were among the first signa-
tories. They have also been strong supporters of the UN Agency established as 
guardian of the Geneva Convention – the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and participate as members of the UNHCR’s Executive 
Committee. However, these same states, when adopting legislation on refugee 
protection in European Union law (EU),2 appear Janus faced. On the one hand, 
statements of commitment to refugee protection are plentiful, on the other, 
mechanisms are adopted which aim to exclude the refugee even from being 
heard. In this article I will examine this contradiction using the concept of gov-
ernmentality as developed by Michel Foucault. Deploying the three techniques 
of governmentality which Foucault developed most – sovereignty, discipline 
and biopolitics – I seek to dissect the asylum protection system the EU is devel-
oping and make visible the underlying structure of authority and power. While 
some academics place great emphasis on the development of a risk society, my 
project is not that. It is an investigation of the articulation between discipline 
and biopolitics in relation to law. 
Before 1999, asylum was an issue for the Member States and the role of 
the EU was no more than to provide a space within which discussion could take 
place and political agreement reached. As the numbers of persons seeking 
protection as refugees in Europe began to rise from about the mid 1980s to 
the mid 1990s and when the political significance of refugee protection in 
Western European states as flight from Communism lost its meaning after 
1989,3 the enthusiasm of European states to provide refugee protection came 
under strain. Increasingly, people seeking refugee protection in Europe were 
stigmatized as ‘bogus’ and the object of suspicion regarding their motives.4 The 
fact that asylum claims dropped in number by more than half in Europe be-
tween 1995 and 2010 is a fact that is rarely mentioned in the debate.5 
                                         
1  Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 189 UNTS 150, 28 Jul 1951 (entry 
into force: 22 Apr. 1954). 
2  All references to the EU take into account the changes brought about in December 2009 
by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty which creates two treaties – the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). A 
first draft of this paper was presented at Lund University, the Nordic Refugee Confer-
ence, February 2009. My sincere thanks to Professor Gregor Noll for inviting me to Lund 
and providing very valuable comments. 
3  In particular the fall of the Berlin Wall is the signifier of the end of the Soviet Union style 
Communist regimes in Europe. 
4  D. Joly (ed.), Global Changes in Asylum Regimes, Basingstoke: Macmillan Palgrave 2002; 
P. Tuitt False Images: Law's Construction of the Refugee, Law and Social Theory Series, 
London: Pluto Press 1996. 
5  UNHCR, Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 2009, Geneva: UNHCR 23 
March 2010; and its predecessors since 2000.  
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As the image of the deserving refugee became detached from that of the 
‘bogus’ asylum seeker (that is someone who is seeking international protection 
but in respect of whom the state authorities have yet to make a decision re-
garding the claim), and the latter became the object of increasing odium, some 
European states which are members of the European Union (Member States) 
began to discuss asylum policy among themselves. These discussions began 
around 1985 but were only formalized in 1993 in an EU venue. It was not until 
1999 that the EU was given powers to develop a Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS). Elsewhere I have examined how and why refugees became 
excluded from EU rules on movement of persons which date from 1957.6 In-
stead, refugees were increasingly marginalized into their own separate uni-
verse in EU law. The first five year programme for the development of an asy-
lum system, the Tampere Conclusions 1999 called for two phases to the devel-
opment of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) – a first ten year period 
within which the adoption of minimum standards would take place and a se-
cond beginning in 2009 moving to one common system. A second multiannual 
programme in 2004 (The Hague Programme) prodded the institutions to com-
plete the first round of asylum legislation and the third multiannual programme 
adopted in Stockholm in December 2009 called for the completion of a truly 
common CEAS. In the meantime the European Commission proposed a series of 
changes to the existing legislation to achieve a common set of standards in 
2009. These proposals are currently under negotiation. After more than ten 
years of a CEAS, it is time to examine the key characteristics of the system. 
What has happened to refugee protection under the system – how can we un-
derstand the nature of refugee protection in light of the EU’s engagement in 
the field? 
The purpose of this paper is to widen our understanding of the mechanisms 
of governance at work in the CEAS while at the same time avoiding what can 
be a somewhat simplistic argument about the denial of humanity to asylum 
seekers in the EU. The latter rather sterile approach not only fails to provide 
insights into the processes at work and the power structures in transformation 
but more critically, it is blind to the complexity of sovereignty which is at the 
centre of the changes. While my approach opens many questions and new av-
enues of research, nonetheless, it permits a more complete understanding of 
what is at stake. One is not required to forget a whole series of developments, 
legal measures, court judgments etc. simply because they do not correspond 
                                         
6  E. Guild, ‘The Europeanisation of Europe’s Asylum Policy’, Int J Refugee Law (2006) 18: 
630-651. 
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with the homo sacer7 analysis of the EU asylum system which is popular in some 
critical quarters. What interests me in this paper is how and with what conse-
quences the EU moves into the field of asylum and what structural changes take 
place either as a result of or in tandem with this shift of power. My objective is 
not to plot a cause and effect relationship but rather to understand what has 
happened to refugees over this ten year period.  
My contention is that the CEAS is in fact creating a system which not only 
changes the meaning of sovereignty but which changes the way in which gov-
ernance takes place in respect of the individual. Much has been written about 
the move of sovereign powers between the EU institutions and the Member 
States.8 What interests me in this paper, however, is to escape that debate 
characterized by a rather Aristotelian hierarchy of authority9 and instead to 
look at how the EU measures change the nature of power relations among state 
authorities and individual asylum seekers. To carry out this examination, Michel 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality is particularly apt.10 What are the 
mechanisms of governmentality which the CEAS enables, blocks or transforms 
and which regulate the lives of individuals seeking international protection in 
the EU? It is important to bear in mind that governance and governmentality 
are not the same thing. I am interested in the governmentality of the govern-
ance of the EU. Governance encompasses the formal structures within which 
authority is exercised. Governmentality, on the other hand, examines the condi-
tions under which authority is constituted and dissipated. 
In the critical social sciences beyond law, the work of Michel Foucault has 
been applied to the question of detention of foreigners and the situation of 
asylum seekers.11 I will not repeat this work some of which I have criticized 
                                         
7  See G. Agamben, Homo Sacer; Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press 1998. 
8  J. Caporaso, ‘Integration Theory, Past and Future’, in W. Sandholtz & A. Stone Sweet, 
European Integration and Supranational Governance, Oxford: OUP 1998; A. Moravcsik, 
‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Ap-
proach’, Journal of Common Market Studies (1993) 31: 473-524, C. Joerges, ‘“Delibera-
tive Political Processes” Revisited: What Have We learned About the Legitimacy of Su-
pranational Decision Making?’, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No. 4, 
2006: 779-812. 
9  R.J.B. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as International Theory, Cambridge: 
CUP 1993. 
10  M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison, London: Penguin Books 1977 
(translation A. Sheridan 1977); M. Foucault, Society must be defended: Lectures at the Col-
lege de France 1975-76, New York: Palgrave 2003 (translation D. Macey 2003); M. 
Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979, New York: 
Palgrave 2008 (translation G. Burchell 2008). 
11  G. Agamben, Homo Sacer; M. Dillon & A. Neal, Foucault on Politics, Security and War, 
Houndmills: Palgrave 2008; T. Spijkerboer, Gender and Refugee Status, Aldershot: Ash-
gate 2000. 
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elsewhere for an inability to take into account the transformation of how power 
is exercised in Europe.12 Here I want to examine the EU’s engagement with 
asylum seekers in order better to understand the mechanism of power and how 
it operates between the EU and the Member States played out on the lives of 
asylum seekers and refugees. Foucault suggests three different ways of think-
ing about power as a relationship among people.13 The first is sovereignty. 
Unlike the usual meaning of sovereignty as relations among states and state 
structures, Foucault focuses on the sovereign as the individual/entity with the 
power of life and death over others in a relationship where the sovereign does 
not need or enter into any other relationship of power with the individual.14 
Law provides the mechanism to determine life and death according to Foucault. 
The sovereign form of power, or as Foucault seems to indicate in his later work, 
governmentality, is that of raison d’état or police state (Polizeistaat) trans-
formed and restructured by discipline and biopolitics when the notion of peo-
ple and law are placed at the heart of the decision making about death and 
punishment.15  
The second form of exercise of power or governmentality16 which Foucault 
uses is that of discipline. Here the individual is differentiated from all other liv-
ing bodies on which power can be inscribed and which is also the site of re-
sistance.17 Power is exercised through the differentiation of the individual 
through discipline which is the flipside of individualization. Through mechanisms 
                                         
12  E. Guild, ‘Exceptionalism and Transnationalism: UK Judicial Control of the Detention of 
Foreign “International terrorists”’, Alternatives/Special English Language Issue of Cultures 
& Conflicts, Vol. 28, No. 4, August-Oct. 2003: 491-515. 
13  B. Hindess, ‘Government and Discipline’, International Political Sociology 2008, Vol. 2, 
Issue 3: 268-270. 
14  F. Gros, États de violence: Essai sur la fin de la guerre, Paris : Gallimard 2006. 
15  M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison, London: Penguin Books 1977 
(translation: 1977 A. Sheridan). 
16  Depending on one’s reading of Foucault’s work over time from Société, Territoire et Popu-
lation (College de France lectures 1977-78) to ‘The political technology of individuals’ in 
L.H. Martin, H. Gutman & P.H. Hutton (eds), Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Mi-
chel Foucault, London: Tavistock 1988. See also Mitchell Dean’s explanation in Critical 
and Effective Histories: Foucault’s Methods and Historical Sociology, New York: Routledge 
1994, ‘It is germane – in light of the possible totalizing reading of the “carceral” appar-
ently authorised by the final part of Discipline and Punish (1977) – that here the power 
of government attains pre-eminence over other forms such as not only sovereignty but 
also, rather intriguingly, discipline (1979a:20 [STP]’, p. 176. ‘However, central, it is per-
haps time to say that this side retained an uncertain status in Foucault’s thought. On the 
one hand, he did not bring the fragments on government together into a fuller, more ex-
plicit work at the time of his death, and we are left with a number of quite distinct, but 
nevertheless broad and coherent, formulations of this notion… Foucault’s general charac-
terisation of government as la conduite de la conduite or the conduct of conduct’, p.178. 
17  D. Bigo, ‘Security: A Field Left Fallow’, in M. Dillon & A. Neal, Foucault on Politics, Security 
and War, Houndmills: Palgrave 2008, p. 93-114. 
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of discipline: prisons, schools, insane asylums etc, individuals are conducted18 
towards conformity to a set of rules. The modalities of discipline include self-
discipline and responsibility. Discipline is thus a productive form of power ac-
cording to Foucault’s approach.19 The three are techniques which generate 
obedience and resistance which are necessary to forms of authority which are 
more complex.20 
The third form is biopolitics which depends centrally on the creation of 
knowledge through the categorization of life.21 The collection of statistics about 
beings creates the possibility to allocate attributes such as normal/abnormal, 
human/animal etc to groups and individuals as they are tested against a norm 
created through the amassing of information. Instead of the body relationship 
of discipline, power is transmitted through the creation of norms and their rela-
tionship with risk. Life is managed through the establishment of norms based on 
the collection of amounts of information and their synthesis into common charac-
teristics which can then be applied to the individual.22 Foucault distinguishes 
between normalization which is the result of statistically determined averages 
and normation which is the way we determine what is ‘normal’ as opposed to 
‘abnormal’.23 
None of the three forms operates in a vacuum. Aspects of all three differ-
ent modalities of the exercise of power may be in operation at the same time. 
Altogether they constitute the means of governmentality – the way in which au-
thority is constructed and deployed. Foucault’s world is populated by apparent 
contradictions and overlaps among the ways in which power relations are con-
structed and managed. Law as a form of governance works equally satisfacto-
rily in all three different modes (sovereignty, discipline and biopolitics) through 
the attributes of rule of law which include human rights norms.24 An important 
aspect of Foucault’s reasoning is the distinction between the pastoral form of 
                                         
18  N. Rose, Governing the Present, Oxford: Polity 2008 – in his introduction he develops 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality as ‘conduct of conduct’. 
19  M. Dean, Governmentality, 2nd edition, London: Sage 2009. 
20  M. Foucault, Society must be defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975-76, New 
York: Palgrave 2003 (translation D. Macey 2003). 
21  Though discipline is also related to the creation of knowledge as a form of power. As 
Bonditti points out, this makes discipline and biopolitics different from sovereignty. 
22  M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979, New 
York: Palgrave 2008 (translation G. Burchell 2008). 
23  C. Ruelle, ‘Population, milieu et normes – Note sur l’ enracinement biologique de la bio-
politique de Foucault’, Labyrinthe 22 (2005) dossier: La biopolitique (d’)après Michel Fou-
cault: 27-36. 
24  M. Valverde, ‘Law versus History: Foucalt’s Geneology of Modern Sovereignty’, in M. 
Dillon & A. Neal, Foucault on Politics, Security and War, Houndmills: Palgrave 2008, 
p. 135-150. Human rights norms here take their normal meaning of international and su-
pranational human rights treaties. 
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power where the analogy of the shepherd and the flock is used. The shepherd 
has a duty to find the lost lamb even if this places at risk the flock. This pastoral 
power is contrasted to utilitarian and predatorial exercise of power where in 
the name of the good of the people anyone or any group can be sacrificed.25 
The originality of Foucault’s approach is not least in its ability to escape from 
what was becoming an increasingly sterile debate among political philosophers 
about the nature of the state and state relations.26 By moving to the practices 
of power, Foucault opens a whole series of new perspectives on how power 
works. However, Foucault takes as a given the relationship of the sovereign to 
space – the sovereign exercises power over a space within which he/it has con-
trol and the last word. Whether this is in the form of the right to kill or not (the 
first form), to determine transgression and decide on punishment (the second 
form) or to choose which categories of information will be collected and what 
meaning they will have vis-à-vis the management of life (the third form), they 
do not permit a further layer of interaction and mediation between the sover-
eign and the supra-national where the last word is the outcome of other mech-
anisms of power relations.  
To take a simple example from the EU, there is currently a raging discus-
sion about the treatment of Afghan and Iraqi asylum seekers in different Mem-
ber States of the EU. UNHCR has criticized heavily the CEAS because outcomes 
for Iraqi are so inconsistent among Member States (for Afghans this means a 0 
recognition rate in Greece and 75 per cent in Finland in 2009).27 The European 
Commission has responded to these criticisms indicating that the CEAS is still 
under construction and as the system begins to work better these differences 
should disappear.28 The result is that in a Foucauldian analysis, the national 
administrators who are applying the CEAS become the people at the cutting 
edge of being disciplined in this scenario of supra-national. They are the ones 
who must do better to render the system coherent (i.e. reduce differences 
among recognition rates for asylum seekers from the same countries) rather 
than respond to the indications given by their national administrations (i.e. sov-
ereigns) on how countries of origin (or applications) should be assessed.  
I will look at two different aspects of the CEAS from the overlapping pow-
er mechanisms of Foucault: 
                                         
25  A. Neal, ‘Goodbye War on Terror ? Foucault and Butler on Discourses of Law, War and 
Exceptionalism’, in M. Dillon & A. Neal, Foucault on Politics, Security and War, Houndmills: 
Palgrave 2008, p. 43-64. 
26  R.B.J. Walker, After the Globe/Before the World, New York: Routledge 2009. 
27  UNHCR, 2009: Global Trends, at http://www.unhcr.org/4c11f0be9.html (visited 18 Au-
gust 2010). 
28  European Commission, Policy Plan on Asylum: An Integrated Approach to Protection Across 
the EU, December 2008. 
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1. How are asylum seekers rendered visible and invisible as rights holders 
through EU law; here the key is the Procedures Directive29 which describes 
which asylum applications must be determined and which can be excluded 
– some asylum seekers cease to be an undifferentiated part of a flow of 
persons and become individuals with rights and complaints and a story to 
tell. Others remain part of a group subject to life and death decisions but 
not individualization. Mechanism after mechanism is described which per-
mits the administrator to avoid listening to the story of the asylum seeker. 
Safe country of origin, safe third country, presumptions of manifestly un-
founded applications, assessments of countries of origin – all these mecha-
nisms are designed to release the national administrator from the duty to 
treat the individual as an individual. Instead, the individual becomes part 
of a category about which a variety of information is collected and then 
applied to prevent the individual to differentiate him or herself from the 
category. This differentiation of the asylum seeker into an individual corre-
sponds best to Foucault’s second category of discipline. The individual must 
fulfill the criteria to be a refugee or suffer the fate of the rejected asylum 
seeker – expulsion. 
2. How does the CEAS operate as a system of biopolitics – the management 
of life through statistics and assessment of risk? This is the most murky of 
Foucault’s categories which he developed least in his work but which has 
been the subject of substantial discussion and analysis since. 
The right to seek asylum – the right to have a claim determined 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality rests on three connected mechanisms. First 
there is the mechanism of discipline – the construction of authority through the 
establishment of rules and hence of a claim to discipline and punish the of-
fender – an act carried out inter alia on the body.30 Foucault uses Bentham’s 
panopticon to exemplify this mechanism of governmentality. The authority in a 
prison is expressed through the possibility of the guards in the guardhouse at 
any time to see any prisoner. The structure of Bentham’s prison permits the 
guard to look into the cell and see the prisoner and thus to know at any given 
moment whether the prisoner is obeying the rules. The capacity to punish is en-
hanced through the capacity to keep the individual under surveillance. While 
the guards may not watch each prisoner all the time, the prisoner does not 
know when he or she is under surveillance and when he or she is not. This results 
                                         
29  Council Directive 2004/83 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status, adopted on 1 December 2005. 
30  M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the birth of the prison, London: Penguin Books 1977 
(translation: 1977 A. Sheridan), p. 222. 
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in asymmetry of knowledge which brings a differential in the power relation. 
The prisoners cannot see the guards so have no knowledge of their actions 
which conform to or break the rules but the opposite is true. Indeed, this is an 
example of power operating by itself – not as something possessed by indi-
viduals.31  
Two aspects are important, first, the guards are able to exercise much 
greater control as they are able to see prisoners whenever they wish to ensure 
that the rules are observed and are able to punish more quickly offenders. 
Secondly, the prisoner who knows that there is this capacity of surveillance 
knows that punishment for offending against the rules does not depend on the 
prisoner being aware of whether the guards are watching or not. In order to 
avoid punishment the prisoners are drawn to exercise auto-discipline – they do 
not undertake acts against the rules as they fear punishment.32 The third step 
for Foucault in the explanation of how governmentality works is responsibility. 
The authorities acknowledge the freedom of the individual to act but warn the 
individual of the consequences of any particular act.33 The example which 
Löwenheim provides is that of foreign ministries in liberal democracies which 
publish warnings to their citizens regarding various countries, advising them not 
to go to those countries because of a variety of risks, spelt out in the notifica-
tions.34 On the one hand, the authority reinforces the individual’s perception of 
freedom by accepting that the individual can travel to any country he or she 
wishes to visit. On the other hand, the authorities create a responsibility on the 
individual related to risk, danger and bodily harm (which finally, according to 
some of the steps Foucault takes towards biopolitics, the individual has learned 
is the greatest ill to be avoided) – if the individual insists on going to a dan-
gerous country he or she takes the risk of the consequences. This then has impor-
tant consequences for the state’s responsibility of protection for its citizens 
abroad.  
So discipline, as the political technology of the body, includes directly dis-
ciplining individuals, auto-discipline and responsibility. A. Dean points out ‘Fou-
cault himself puts this argument for the interdependence of citizenship rights 
and disciplinary power in a more general form: the “Enlightenment” which dis-
covered the liberties, also invented the disciplines.’35 The question now is how 
                                         
31  M. Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, London: Sage 1999. 
32  D. Bigo, ‘Security: A Field Left Fallow’, in M. Dillon & A. Neal, Foucault on Politics, Security 
and War, Houndmills: Palgrave 2008, p. 93-114. 
33  M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, 
Houndmills: Palgrave 2008 (translation: G. Burchell). 
34  O. Löwenheim, ‘The Responsibility to Responsibilize: Foreign Offices and the Issuing of 
Travel Warnings’, IPS (2007) Vol. 1, No. 3: 203-221. 
35  Dean 1977, supra, p. 222-223. 
Guild: From Persecution to Management of Populations 
 
 
12 
 
does this approach provide clarity to the CEAS – does Foucault illuminate the 
structure of the CEAS and the construction of authority in respect of the asylum 
seeker?  
The surveillance of the EU external border by the Member States and co-
ordinated by FRONTEX,36 echoes Foucault’s use of Bentham’s panopticon but 
only in part. As Bigo has developed,37 the EU external border is more of a 
banopticon, invisible or very light for the so called bona fide traveller but a 
block to the asylum seeker and the person suspected of seeking to enter the EU 
irregularly. Among the fundamental problems of this approach in the EU is de-
termining who is likely to be an irregular migrant, who an asylum seeker and 
who is a bona fide traveller (thereby creating these population categories). 
People coming from the same countries may fall into all three categories.  
Contrary to the idea of clear cut categories (such as Weberian ideal 
types) those of sovereignty, discipline and biopolitics are intertwined in time. 
The suggestion that each age is dominated by one category only would entail 
the disappearance of sovereignty, law and discipline in a risk management 
society governed by biopolitics only. This is obviously not the case. It is impor-
tant to show that discipline is embedded into biopolitics of population and re-
framed in order to supplement this biopolitics. The EU, however, has taken a 
risk oriented approach – if there is a risk of irregular migration then further 
exclusionary procedures apply (visa requirements, in depth interviews at consu-
lates abroad before travel, immigration liaison officers at some airports to 
provide advice to airlines whom to refuse boarding access, reinforced border 
patrols at land and sea borders etc). The creation of the category of foreigner 
who is risky, who should be under surveillance is established. The group is 
based on heterogeneous characteristics – completely different countries of na-
tionality, different social and economic classes (though the poor are generally 
a risk), different genders. The measures are adopted to keep under surveil-
lance and outside the EU this collection of people who are transformed into a 
population though they share no common characteristics outside those which are 
allocated to them by the EU border surveillance system.38 
Having established the subject population (which does not, for instance, in-
clude US nationals who do not require visas, in respect of whom no immigration 
liaison officers are posted at US airports, who are assumed not to be poor), the 
                                         
36  The EU’s external border agency: Regulation 2007/2004 establishing External Borders 
Agency (OJ 2004 L 349/1). 
37  D. Bigo, The Birth of Ban-opticon: Detention of Foreigners in (il)liberal Regimes, Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian 
Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, 5 March 2005. 
38  For a collection of essays which develop this subject see: B. Ryan & V. Mitsilegas, Extra-
territorial Immigration Control: Legal Challenges, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2010. 
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next step is to establish surveillance. The illusion is of a panopticon, the EU im-
migration guards can see every EU external border simultaneously though they 
may not be looking at any given moment. But it is actually more of a banopti-
con where the majority of travellers are unaware of those under surveillance 
and do not consider themselves to be so. Where individuals are perceived to 
be irregularly crossing or seeking to cross a border, they are the subject of 
discipline. The EU’s external border surveillance system, EUROSUR is designed 
to do exactly this.39 The proposal sets out a roadmap for setting up a ‘system 
of systems’ interconnecting and rationalising border surveillance systems at the 
national level, improving the performance of surveillance as a tool and creat-
ing a common monitoring and information-sharing environment for the EU mari-
time domain. The objective is to focus on the EU’s southern and eastern maritime 
borders and achieve full awareness for border guards of the situation at the 
external borders. 
If the (wrong) individuals manage to cross the border into the EU then they 
may be detained and should be expelled.40 If they are perceived to be trying 
to arrive at the EU external border, FRONTEX operations aim to prevent their 
arrival and to send them back whence they came. If they are obstinate and 
continue, they are at high risk of drowning in the Atlantic on route to the Ca-
nary Islands, in the Mediterranean on route to the Italian, Maltese, Greek or 
Spanish coasts.41 Alternatively, they may be killed by the border guards of 
neighbouring states outside the EU (which are major beneficiaries of EU border 
surveillance funds) such as Libya, Tunisia or elsewhere.42 Thus there is the estab-
lishment of authority through a system of surveillance and punishment of a 
population designated by the authority itself in accordance with rules it has 
unilaterally determined. What is new in this constellation is the way in which it is 
cut free from the state. Instead of Member State actions, these are European 
initiatives and measures, an EU agency which is at the centre of the project of 
surveillance and punishment. The punishment is presented as a form of risk 
rather than direct punishment. FRONTEX officials and state border guards con-
sistently deny that they are in any way complicit in the drowning of persons in 
the Atlantic or Mediterranean or the killing of individuals by border guards in 
                                         
39  COM (2008) 68 final. 
40  The Returns Directive 2008/115 (OJ 2008 L 348/98) – deadline for transposition: 24 
Dec. 2010) 
41  http://www.noborder.org/dead.php – No Borders is an NGO which keeps statistics of 
migrants who die seeking to enter the EU. Since December 2002 they have received in-
formation of 3,893 deaths (visited: 20 August 2010). 
42  Human Rights Watch, Pushed Back, Pushed Around: Italy’s Forced Return of Boat Migrants 
and Asylum Seekers and Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers, New York: 
HRW, 21 September 2009.  
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third countries when those individuals are seeking to leave those third countries 
to enter the EU.43 Nonetheless, the numbers of persons who lose their lives in 
this way raises serious questions. If the EU agency is so successful at surveillance 
of the external border surely it is capable of ensuring that people do not die 
there?44 
Assuming that the population is a homogeneous one, as the EU seeks to do, 
then the fact of punishment through death, detention and expulsion ought to 
create self-discipline of each individual coming within the group of people on 
the move, not only the one who has been the subject of the measure. The deter-
rence effect should result in the ‘conduct of the conduct’ in other words the ca-
pacity to structure the choices of others.45 The individuals should learn not to 
behave in this way – i.e. to try to gain access to the EU as this will create a 
high risk of death, detention or expulsion. The problem is that this is not a ho-
mogeneous population.46 People who move are a highly diverse group who 
travel for such a wide variety of reasons that it is virtually impossible to classify 
them all. The third of Foucault’s mechanisms of governmentality – responsibility 
– is embedded in the second, auto-discipline in the case of EU approaches to 
irregular migration. The pervasive argument is that these persons ought to know 
that they are putting themselves at risk. If they do not know, then this is the fault 
of another image which has taken shape in the hands of the EU – the trafficker 
and smuggler of human beings. This is the evil exploiter of human misery who 
hides the risk from the irregular migrant and charges high fees for doing so.47 
However, the intermediary between the authority and the offender is only a 
secondary target, the main target is the foreigner. 
The asylum seeker creates a series of tensions within the system by belong-
ing to a class entitled to international protection. At great cost to logical argu-
ment, even common sense, the EU and the Member States resist strenuously all 
suggestions that the right to protection to which the refugee is entitled from 
them in international law includes a right to arrive at the border of the territo-
                                         
43  J. Rijpma, FRONTEX: Successful Blame Shifting of the Member States? (ARI), Madrid: Real 
Instituto Elcano, 13 April 2010. 
44  The NGO Fortress Europe maintains a site with information about the deaths 
http://fortresseurope.blogspot.com/2006/02/immigrants-dead-at-frontiers-of-europe_ 
16.html. 
45  N. Rose, Governing the Present, London: Policy 2008. 
46  An academic who has used Foucault’s notion of conduct of conduct in relation to the 
treatment of asylum seekers and refugees is Jennifer Hyndman – for an overview see ‘In-
troduction: the feminist politics of refugee migration’, Gender, Place and Culture (2010), 
Vol. 17, Issue 4: 453-459. 
47  R. Koslowski & D. Kyle, Global Human Smuggling, Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press 2001. 
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ry.48 Instead the EU and the Member States cling relentlessly to the idea that 
only the lucky or devious refugee who has managed to escape all the obstacles 
(legitimate, according to the EU and its Member States) which have been 
placed to prevent him or her from ever getting near an EU border, and has 
arrived in the state is entitled to protection (if, of course, he or she can present 
an argument which the state accepts as entitling him or her to protection). 
UNHCR continues to argue that the foreigner who claims asylum from the au-
thorities of a state is entitled to a consideration of that claim. This is the princi-
ple contained in the Dublin II Regulation and the Qualification Directive. Thus 
the foreigner is part of a population which is being actively persuaded (by a 
FRONTEX operation for instance) not to enter the territorial waters of an EU 
Member State, nonetheless if the individual is seeking international protection 
he or she should be entitled to the benefits of the Qualification and Procedures 
Directives. This is a very inconvenient position for the EU border surveillance 
system. If accepted, it cuts a huge hole in the centre of the design – the popula-
tion which has been constructed as the object of the governmentality project 
cannot be treated as a single population because of the so-called mixed flows 
problem (i.e. flows of both potentially irregular migrants and refugees togeth-
er). 
When the individual arrives in the EU, as so many still do notwithstanding,49 
he or she faces a series of disciplining measures in the search for protection. 
Asylum seekers start as individuals, foreigners who arrive at the border of a 
territory. If they have not read the Geneva Convention and the EU Procedures 
Directive (a common failing among them as a group) they do not know that 
they are obliged to seek asylum from an official as soon as they arrive at the 
territory. But if they delay in making their asylum application they may not ob-
tain a full procedure. Article 23(4)(i) and (j) Procedures Directive states that 
Member States may prioiritize or accelerate (which means a truncated proce-
dure) any application which is considered unfounded because ‘the applicant 
has failed without reasonable cause to make his/her application earlier, having 
had the opportunity to do so or the applicant is making an application merely 
in order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of an earlier or imminent deci-
sion which would result in his/her removal’. The state authorities decide whether 
                                         
48  A good example from the UK can be found in the judgment R v Secretary of State ex 
parte European Roma Rights Centre [2004] UKHL 55. Also see V. Moreno Lax, Must EU 
Borders have Doors for Refugees?, CRIDHO Working Paper 2008/03. 
49  According to UNHCR in 2005 the EU 27 states entertained 240,950 asylum applications; 
in 2006 the number was 201,000; in 2007 it was 223,670, the next year 239,150 and 
in 2009 it reached 246,210. UNHCR, Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries 
2009 Geneva: UNHCR, 23 March 2010. The population of the EU 27 is over 500 mil-
lion. 
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an individual comes within one of these categories. However, if the asylum 
seeker has read the Procedures Directive he or she might baulk at making an 
application for asylum at the border after reading Article 35 which permits 
Member States to maintain border procedures which do not fulfil the proce-
dural requirements of ‘normal’ applications, in particular they may be denied a 
judicial remedy.  
Once asylum seekers are on the territory and have made an asylum appli-
cation they are within the EURODAC system and so under surveillance in a very 
obvious way. But just to make sure that the asylum seeker does not seek to hide 
his or her ‘true’ identity, article 23(4)(d) Procedures Directive allows Member 
States to truncate the investigation of the claim to international protection be-
cause ‘the applicant has misled the authorities by presenting false information 
or documents or by withholding relevant information or documents with respect 
to his/her identity and/or nationality that could have had a negative impact on 
the [protection] decision’. State authorities will not tolerate complex identities. 
Asylum seekers are not like other people, they are obliged to inform the state 
about all aspects of their existence. Article 11(2) Procedures Directive sets out 
among the obligations on the asylum seeker to the state:  
• A requirement to report to the competent authorities or to appear before 
them in person either without delay or at a specified time (specified by the 
state authorities); 
• A requirement to hand over to the authorities documents in their possession 
relevant to the examination of the application, such as passports; 
• A requirement to inform the competent authorities of their current place of 
residence or address and of any changes thereof as soon as possible. 
Member States may provide that the applicant shall have to accept any 
communication at the most recent place of residence or address which 
he/she indicated; 
• A requirement to submit to searches by the competent authorities both of 
the person and of any items which the asylum seeker has with him/her; 
• A requirement to submit to photographs; 
• A requirement to submit to recording of oral statements (though the au-
thorities must advise the asylum seeker that a recording is being made). 
 
Asylum seekers are defined out of rights such as that of integrity of the person. 
The state has claimed the right to carry out searches on asylum seekers bodies 
and property within the obligation to justify why or to have reasons for such 
searches. However, this EU framed exclusionary move is always countered by 
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the supranational legal framework which at the same time prohibits it.50 The 
struggle is one between the capture of individuals into a population as a cate-
gory and the supranational human rights legal system which entitles the individ-
ual to escape. 
In order to move from being asylum seekers to refugees, individuals need 
to engage with the Member States’ administrations and to persuade them of 
the validity of their claims. While individuals have lives and stories full of con-
tradictions, incoherence and detail, the claim to international protection must be 
accompanied by a single coherent, consistent story without deviations or messy 
edges which proves that the individual fulfils the definition of a refugee – a 
well founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The punishment for 
failing to present a clear, consistent and coherent story comes in a number of 
forms. First, a messy claim will not get a full procedure. Article 23(4)(g) Proce-
dures Directive states that a Member State can prioritize or accelerate (i.e. 
limit procedural rights) where ‘the applicant has made inconsistent, contradic-
tory, improbable or insufficient representations which make his/her claim 
clearly unconvincing in relation to his/her having been the object of persecu-
tion…’. This will assist towards the claim being rejected outright. In this case the 
individual will probably become a person irregularly present on the territory 
and subject to detention and expulsion. Alternatively, the state authorities may 
decide that although the refugee claim is not made out the individual needs 
international protection and so under the Qualification Directive is entitled to 
subsidiary protection. 
In the first case the punishment is immediately evident – reduced proce-
dural guarantees for the asylum claim. In the second the punishment is no pro-
tection, the threat of detention and the menace of expulsion. These punishments 
are normally accompanied by notification that the individual is illegally present 
(i.e. use of the criminal law directly),51 a prohibition on working and the denial 
of all social benefits and housing. Once refused asylum, the individual can no 
longer claim material support under the Reception Conditions Directive. The 
individual is thus further punished by destitution. In the second case, the punish-
ment is more subtle. While the individual gets a status, those who are given 
                                         
50  Of course asylum seekers can claim the benefit of Article 8 ECHR which the ECtHR inter-
preted as incompatible with police stop and search powers which are not based on rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal activity Gillan & Quinton v UK ECtHR 28 June 2010, Appli-
cation no. 4158/05. However, the fear of being refused asylum acts as a disciplining 
technique which means asylum seekers very rarely complain about human rights abuses 
other than in relation to the substance of their claims at least during the procedure. 
51  Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘It is wrong to criminalize migration’, 
August 2008. 
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subsidiary protection rather than refugee status have many fewer entitlements. 
They may be granted lower social benefits and limited health care. They get 
reduced access to family reunification. Articles 9-12 of the Family Reunification 
Directive 2003/8652 which provide for family reunion for refugees under con-
ditions which are more favourable than those applying to other third country 
nationals. However, Article 3(c) excludes from its scope persons with subsidiary 
protection. Thus access to family reunification for anyone with a status less than 
full refugee is left to the vagaries of national law. Persons with subsidiary pro-
tection have residence documents of shorter duration than those which must be 
accorded to refugees. They are punished for their failure to provide a suffi-
ciently coherent story by being allocated a less favourable residence status.53 
However, in most Member States the majority of persons who are given sub-
sidiary protection come from the same countries as those who receive refugee 
status. According to UNHCR 2008 statistics in the Netherlands 91 Iranians were 
recognised as refugees and 138 were given subsidiary protection. In the UK 
290 Iranians were recognised as refugees and 170 got subsidiary protection. 
In Sweden 124 were recognised and 51 got subsidiary protection. In Denmark 
the figures were 118 refugees and 12 beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.  
Once again, the asylum seeker ought to know that he or she is required to 
provide a clear and consistent statement. Indeed, in many Member States in-
formation pamphlets are given to asylum seekers warning them of the necessity 
to provide a clear and concise statement which corresponds to the refugee 
definition in the Qualification Directive. Thus states seek to make the individual 
responsible for his or her fate. If the individual persists in being unable to pro-
vide such a clear and coherent statement then the risk of a lower status or re-
fusal is on him or her.  
Further, the asylum seeker is also made responsible for the acts of third 
states through a transmission of duties of third countries onto the figure of the 
asylum seeker. For instance, if the asylum seeker is trying to enter the state or 
has entered the state ‘illegally’ from a country which ought to be safe, then the 
Member State where the application is made has no obligation to examine the 
application at all. There can be no procedure at all within which the asylum 
seeker can make his or her claim for international protection (Article 36 Proce-
dures Directive). The directive then goes on to set out how these countries which 
ought to be safe are to be determined – European safe third countries as they 
                                         
52  Directive 2003/86 on family reunification (OJ 2003 L 251/12): transposition deadline 3 
October 2005. 
53  The Commission’s proposal for a Recast of the Qualification Directive proposes the up-
ward harmonization of the rights of beneficiaries of subsidiary protection to those of 
refugees though it is far from clear that this will be accepted by the Council: COM 
(2009) 551. 
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are designated. The characteristics of the European safe third country which 
have the consequence of denying the asylum seeker an opportunity to have his 
or her claim to protection heard in an EU Member State are: 
• The country has ratified and observes the Geneva Convention; 
• It has in place an asylum procedure proscribed by law; 
• It has ratified the European Convention on Human Rights and observes its 
provisions including standards relating to effective remedies; 
• It has been designated by the Council as a safe third country.54 
 
In 2009, according to UNHCR statistics, Russian nationals were the third largest 
group of persons seeking asylum in the EU (after Iraqis and Somalis).55 A case 
can be made that the Russian Federation fulfils three of the four criteria to be 
a European safe third country: it has ratified and observes the Geneva Con-
vention, it has an asylum procedure in place, it is a party to the ECHR and ap-
pears regularly before the Court but as there is no designated list of safe third 
countries by the Council (yet) this final criterion is missing. If one examines 
UNHCR statistics for 2008,56 protection rates in EU countries for asylum seekers 
from the Russian Federation was running at 17 per cent in the Netherlands, 53 
per cent in Poland and 70 in Denmark and Finland. Average protection rates in 
the EU tend to vary around 10-30 per cent.  
State authorities’ capacity to punish the asylum seeker and the practices of 
punishment are not always co-extensive. However, the key point here is that it 
is the asylum seeker who, by reason of having travelled through the Russian 
Federation and having arrived at the border of an EU state or entered ‘ille-
gally’, is made responsible for the Russian Federation’s treatment of asylum 
seekers. Subject to the adoption of a list of safe countries of origin by the 
Council (which is currently blocked) he or she could be returned to the Russian 
Federation without any examination of his or her asylum claim in the EU as the 
Russian Federation can be classified, according to the EU’s criteria as a safe 
third country. The fact that Russia is an important country of origin of refugees 
and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection in the EU does not affect the EU’s 
capacity to classify that state as safe for asylum seekers from other countries. 
The asylum seeker’s alleged choice of travelling through Russia to get to the EU 
results in the asylum seeker bearing the consequences of the EU’s assumption 
                                         
54  As the exercise of the power to designate a country as a European safe third country 
was challenged by the European Parliament before the European Court of Justice which 
handed down judgment in favour of the Parliament in May 2008, there has not yet been 
the necessary Council Decision, C-133/06 Parliament v Council 6 May 2008. 
55  UNHCR, Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries, Geneva: 2009UNHCR, 23 
March 2010.  
56  http://www.unhcr.org/statistics.html. 
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that the Russian Federation is a safe place for the asylum seeker to seek pro-
tection. If the asylum seeker does not want to be sent to the Russian Federation 
to seek international protection he or she should not travel through it on his or 
her way to the EU!57 
The Procedures Directive adds a number of finesses to the discipline, auto-
discipline and responsibility of asylum seekers. The directive includes punish-
ments in the form of procedural presumptions against the individual which ap-
ply in various circumstances. As outlined above these apply to the individual 
who failed to apply for asylum immediately or as soon as possible after arri-
val in the territory of a member State may be punished by being given few 
procedural guarantees. Similarly, the individual who has trouble providing a 
story which fulfils the strict legal definition of a refugee is punished by a pre-
sumption that his or her claim is manifestly ill-founded because the state au-
thorities consider that it is not plausible or there are internal inconsistencies. 
These procedural punishments lead towards rejection of the protection claim – 
the greatest punishment for failing to persuade the authorities of the need for 
international protection. Similarly, a careless, unwitting or unavoidable travel 
choice may result in the asylum seeker getting no consideration of his or her 
protection claim in the EU. 
To give the system of punishments against the asylum seeker greater co-
herence and impact, many Member States have increased the expulsion of 
persons to whom they have refused asylum. These persons are designated as 
‘failed asylum seekers’. The use of the term ‘failed’ evokes fault of the individ-
ual that he or she has not succeeded in obtaining international protection just as 
students who fail their exams did not study sufficiently or were inadequate. The 
individual is responsible for his or her fate, the authorities warned him or her of 
the risk of a poor application but he or she persisted in pursuing, inadequately, 
the claim.58 Foucault’s template for analysis of governmentality through disci-
pline provides a most revealing picture of the CEAS. 
The CEAS as an instrument of Biopolitics? 
In this final section, I will examine the most complex of Foucault’s categories – 
that of biopolitics – and how it assists us to understand the system of govern-
mentality which is at work in the CEAS. In his own work, Foucault opened a 
number of windows of research regarding biopolitics which lead in rather dif-
                                         
57  The Commission’s proposal for a recast of the Procedures Directive published in 2009 
(COM(2009)554) recommends the abolition of the category of European safe third 
countries but it is unclear whether the Council will accept this. 
58  For instance the UK statistics use in the title ‘removals of failed applicants…’. The num-
bers of so-called failed asylum seekers removed from the UK varied from 6,800 in 2003 
to 3,035 in 2007; Asylum Statistics United Kingdom 2007, 21 August 2008. 
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ferent directions. He was less than clear about what the term means.59 The 
separation of life into zôê – the force of life itself not limited to humans, and 
bios – life as lived by humans alone has been developed by Agamben60 in 
particular in relation to foreigners and detention centres. His contention is that 
in Europe there is a trend to deny the bios of the foreigner. Butler61 follows 
quite a different approach to biopolitics which Foucault opened, that relating 
to the learned and thus ultimately political nature of even those responses 
which we considered to be our most intimate. Butler develops, in particular, 
Foucault’s interest in the example of gender and sex.  
For the purposes of this section, I will focus on another aspect of Foucault’s 
concept of biopolitics which is that related to the management of life itself.62 
How does the CEAS reduce the individual to a population which is managed, 
not least through statistical information which is then applied to the individual 
and has the consequence of preventing the individual from escaping through his 
or her claim to differentiation? At the heart of the CEAS is the endless search 
for the mechanism to differentiate the deserving asylum seeker from the one 
who must become the failed asylum seeker. A quicker, surer system for reach-
ing decisions on individual cases is the holy grail – in particular a system which 
does not require too much expenditure of state resources in personnel, training 
etc. Indeed, if there is a safe way to decide cases which is collective and thus 
avoids the need for officials to spend time looking at individual stories and 
trying to decide whether they are true or false, this is what many Member 
States would like most of all from the CEAS. On the other hand, UNHCR end-
lessly reminds the Member States and the EU institutions of their duty under the 
Geneva Convention to consider each asylum claim and to make sure that no 
one who has sought international protection is rejected if the consequence 
would be that he or she would be sent back to persecution.63 The problem is 
how to reconcile these two objectives, satisfy UNHCR and fulfill the states’ obli-
                                         
59  M. Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, 
Houndsmill: Palgrave 2008 (translation: G. Burchell) – see also footnote 17; G. Burchell, 
‘Liberal Government and Techniques of the Self’, in A. Barry, T. Osborne & N. Rose, Fou-
cault and Political Reason, Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government, Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press 1996, p. 44. 
60  See footnote 5. 
61  J. Butler, Gender Trouble Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York: Routledge 
1999. 
62  An important discussion also needs to take place on the identity of the target population 
as regards the management of life – is it the population of asylum seekers or the EU 
population which must be protected from asylum seekers? 
63  See for instance Judith Kumin, Director, UNHCR Bureau for Europe, to the Cross-Dimen-
sional Corfu Meeting, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Vi-
enna, 28 May 2010 at http://www.unhcr.org/4c03cf106.html (visited 20 August 2010). 
Guild: From Persecution to Management of Populations 
 
 
22 
 
gations in international law and decide cases rapidly and with a minimum ex-
penditure of resources.  
The Procedures Directive provides a tool in the form of a number of con-
cepts which allow state authorities to divide individuals into groups and deal 
with them collectively, rather than as individuals. These are: 
• The European safe third country (discussed above); 
• The first country of asylum; 
• The [general] safe third country; and  
• The safe country of origin.  
 
The key is to create a category according to a set of rules which are not sub-
ject to change by the individual then to ensure that the individual classified as 
belonging to the category has little or no chance of escaping it. The justification 
for the class is based on statistical information used to construct the group. The 
individual once classified as belonging to it, is not allowed to differentiate him- 
or herself from it. I have described the European safe third country principle 
above. In this case, Member States can simply dispense with a procedure alto-
gether where the asylum seeker has passed through a European safe third 
country en route to the Member State. These people simply do not exist for the 
Member State as a category in respect of which the authorities are obliged to 
consider a protection claim at all, the individual is fully and successfully sub-
sumed into a group which does not enjoy a right to protection in the Member 
State under the Geneva Convention (Article 36 Procedures Directive). 
Similarly, the first country of asylum concept creates a category of persons 
in respect of whom any application for asylum can be dismissed without con-
sideration as inadmissible (Article 25 Procedures Directive). Like the European 
safe third country concept, the category is constructed not in relation to the in-
dividual characteristics of the asylum seeker and his or her claim but by virtue 
of the state authorities’ assessment of a third country (i.e. not the country from 
which the asylum seekers fears persecution). This class of persons contains every 
asylum seeker who can be sent to a country which fulfils, in the opinion of the 
decision maker, one of two characteristics (Article 26 Procedures Directive): 
• The country has recognized the asylum seeker as a refugee (and that status 
is still available to the individual); or 
• The country will make available to the individual sufficient protection in-
cluding protection from refoulement. 
 
The unifying feature of the two branches of the concept is that state officials 
are entitled to believe and rely upon assurances from other countries regard-
ing what their officials will or will not do in respect of the asylum seeker and 
thereby avoid considering the claim of the asylum seeker him- or herself. There 
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is no obligation on Member States even to listen to an account of the individu-
al’s claim regarding persecution so long as the authorities of another state con-
firm that they will permit the individual back into their state and not refoule him 
or her to a state where there is a real risk that he or she will suffer persecution.  
The [general] safe third country concept creates yet another category of 
asylum seekers, sui generis among themselves, as the only characteristic which 
they share is the way in which they have been designated by the Member 
State where they seek asylum as persons whose claims are inadmissible. The 
consequence of being designated as an asylum seeker with a safe third country 
option is that the protection claim can, once again, be treated as inadmissible 
(Article 25(2)(c) Procedures Directive). As above in respect of first safe country 
of asylum, this means that the state authorities are not required even to receive, 
let alone read or struggle with, the account of the individual’s persecution. The 
elements of the safe third country concept, like those of the safe first country 
concept, depend on the confidence of the state authorities regarding the prac-
tices of another state’s authorities. The individual has no control over that as-
sessment as it has nothing to do with the individual characteristics of the asylum 
seeker. It becomes a matter between states. The Member State where the asy-
lum seeker has sought protection can consider the application inadmissible if 
there is another state which fulfils the following characteristics, according to the 
Member State officials’ assessment:64 
• The state will not threaten the life or liberty of the asylum seeker on ac-
count of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion; 
• The state will not refoule the individual to a country where there is a sub-
stantial risk he or she will suffer persecution; 
• The state will not send the individual to a country where there is a substan-
tial risk that he or she will suffer torture, inhuman or degrading treatment; 
• The state’s legal or administrative system allows for the possibility that the 
individual can make an application for asylum and if the state authorities 
determine the application favourably they will provide protection to the 
individual. 
 
Instead of the individual’s claim of persecution being the subject of carefully 
scrutiny, it is the assessment by the Member State authorities of the adequacy 
of the third country’s asylum system which becomes the focus of attention. Arti-
cle 27(2) Procedures Directive requires the state authorities to have national 
legislation for the safe third country concept. The rules must include some con-
nection between the asylum seeker and the third country which makes it rea-
                                         
64  Article 25(2)(c) Procedures Directive. 
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sonable to send the person there though there is no need for the individual ever 
to have set foot in the third country and there are no examples provided of 
what kind of connection might be adequate. The matter is left to the imagina-
tion of the Member State authorities and their legislators. The methodology by 
which the Member State authorities determine safe third countries must fulfill 
one of two requirements: either it includes a case by case consideration of the 
safety of the country for the particular asylum seeker or it includes a national 
designation of countries considered to be generally safe. In the first limb of the 
provision there is a vestigal and displaced asylum determination procedure 
which instead of considering whether the asylum seeker would be persecuted 
by the state which he or she claims intends to persecute him or her, it requires 
an examination whether the individual will be persecuted by quite another 
state with which the individual may have only the most tenuous ties (Article 
27)(2)(b) Procedures Directive). The second limb removes the asylum seeker 
from the equation – the only relevant consideration is whether some state 
through which the individual passed on his or her way to the EU state has been 
designated by the national authorities as safe.  
Nonetheless, the Member State must have rules which allow the asylum 
seeker to challenge the safe third country allocation on the basis that he or she 
would be subject to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment in that country 
(Article 27(2)(c) Procedures Directive). One has a sense that here, at least, the 
individual can escape the oppression of the category into which he or she has 
been pushed. However, on examination, one sees that in fact, this escape valve 
is the direct and unavoidable application of Article 3 ECHR. Council of Europe 
states, whether they are EU Member States or not, are under a general duty 
not to return someone to a country where there is a substantial risk that he or 
she would suffer torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The 
ECtHR has held that this obligation must be carried out on the basis of an indi-
vidual consideration of the circumstances of each person.65 Effectively, what the 
Procedures Directive does here is acknowledge that it is subservient to interna-
tional rule of law at least as regards the European Convention on Human 
Rights. As the ECHR has its own court which interprets the meaning of the ECHR, 
the EU is obliged to acknowledge the primacy of that interpretation of the 
ECHR rights, rather than one which some Member States might prefer. Indeed, 
Article 6 Treaty on European Union (TEU) acknowledges the duty of the EU (in-
cluding its Member States when within the scope of EU law) to respect the 
ECHR. Further it calls for the EU to accede to the ECHR. 
This is the most important difference between the way in which the ECHR 
operates as a restraint on the EU legislator through its independent judicial su-
                                         
65  Salah Sheekh v Netherlands, ECtHR 11 January 2007, Application no. 1948/04. 
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pervisory body and the way the Geneva Convention operates. In respect of 
the latter the EU legislator can and does make endless references to the su-
premacy of the Geneva Convention and its obedience to international rule of 
law and then goes on the interpret the Geneva Convention as it wishes whether 
or not that coincides with the interpretation which the Member States them-
selves agreed in the context of the UNHCR Executive Committee.66 The TEU 
now also calls for the EU to accede to the Geneva Convention. 
The final concept which I will consider here is that of safe country of origin. 
This is a category which designates the individual by reference to his or her 
country of origin. It is the classification of people as not refugees because they 
are nationals of a specific state. As such it is the most controversial as it denies 
the very essence of the refugee, the individual who claims a well founded fear 
of persecution from his or her country of origin. The concept is one which oblite-
rates Geneva Convention protection on the basis of where an individual comes 
from. It is inherently contradictory to the Geneva Convention as it undermines 
the universality of the right to protection. Instead of all people being eligible 
for protection from persecution only people from some countries are, not those 
from other states. For this reason the category of asylum seekers who can be 
denied a consideration of their claims on this ground is more fluid than the oth-
er categories. While it is very hard if not impossible for an asylum seeker to 
escape the straightjacket of his or her classification as part of the category of 
inadmissible applicants under the European safe third country concept, the safe 
first country of asylum concept or the [general] safe third country concept, there 
is more wiggle room for those classified as having a safe country of origin 
which excludes their application.  
As in respect of the category of European safe third countries, the construc-
tion of the group requires a decision by the Council. For the same reasons as in 
respect of the European safe third country category, this list has never been 
established. The CJEU found in favour of the European Parliament in its chal-
lenge to the legality of the procedure for the adoption of such a list. In the 
Commission’s proposal for a Recast of the Procedures Directive it recommends 
that there be no common list of safe countries of origin only common objective 
criteria for national designations of third countries as safe countries of origin. In 
other words, variations among the Member States regarding which countries 
are safe countries of origin will be permitted but each Member State must justi-
fy its list.67 The logic of the provision means that an individual comes from a 
                                         
66  For a good example see UNHCR on the Procedures Directive: C. Costello, The European 
Asylum Procedures Directive in Legal Contest, UNHCR Research Paper 134, November 
2006. 
67  COM(2009)554. 
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country which has been designated a safe country of origin his or her applica-
tion can be considered as unfounded (Article 23(4)(c)(i) Procedures Directive). 
Article 28 of the Directive requires that the individual must not be a refugee in 
accordance with the Qualification Directive but the same provision allows Mem-
ber States to treat the application as manifestly unfounded under national law. 
So while under the directive the Member State authorities are not permitted to 
avoid a consideration of refugee status, they are allowed to apply national 
law to treat the application as manifestly unfounded. This is not only contradic-
tory but smacks of dubious good faith. The criteria for designating a country 
safe are contained in Annex II of the Directive and include: 
• There is generally and consistently no persecution or torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment; 
• There is no threat by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of inter-
national or internal armed conflict; 
 
Account must be taken of the extent to which protection is provided against 
persecution or mistreatment. This categorization is generalized and specific to 
the country. The individual has no chance of influencing the categorization ex-
cept indirectly by challenging the generality of the categorization.  
The search for the collective designation of the individual in order to avoid 
the consideration of the individual application which is apparent in the CEAS 
corresponds to one of the meanings of biopolitics which Foucault suggested. The 
state’s control over life and death, as asylum is a matter of life or death, is in-
corporated into a statistically or collectively based approach to the manage-
ment of population. The management of risk takes place through the sealing of 
the individual into a category which is determined according to a collective 
assessment of the seriousness of the risk. Every effort is made to ensure that the 
individual does not escape that category as every exception is costly in terms 
of state resources. The cost of life or death for the individual is subsumed into 
the state’s collective risk assessment strategy which is privileged. The EU be-
comes an instrument through which there is a generalization of the mechanism 
of population management through risk assessment. This fulfils two important 
objectives, it provides inter-state solidarity for the system against complaints by 
UNHCR, other international organizations, non-governmental organizations and 
others that the system is inconsistent with the Member States’ obligations under 
the Geneva Convention; secondly, it provides reinforcement against internal 
dissent within EU states against the application of mechanisms of biopolitics 
against the most vulnerable individuals in the community – asylum seekers. 
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Conclusions 
In this article I have examined the three techniques of governmentality which 
Foucault develops – sovereignty, discipline and biopolitics in the context of the 
EU’s Common European Asylum System. Using Foucault’s framework to under-
stand the logic of power and authority, the underpinnings of the CEAS become 
visible. I examine the management of the EU’s external border and the catego-
rization of asylum seekers by reference to the external border through disci-
pline as a technology of governmentality. The existence of refugees as a group 
of persons entitled to cross borders to seek international protection fits uneasily 
with the EU’s development of a common external border control designed to 
admit and exclude third country nationals on the basis of criteria incompatible 
with refugee protection. The logic of discipline, auto-discipline and responsibili-
zation of the asylum seeker provides a way to escape the conundrum. If the 
drowning of the individual in the Mediterranean is the fault of the asylum seek-
er him- or herself for engaging in risk behaviour against the discipline of the 
EU, criticism is deflected from the EU institutions. Instead, it is the asylum seeker 
who is failing to respond properly to the discipline and punishment of govern-
mentality. 
In the final section I turn to biopolitics as a means of governmentality in the 
CEAS. The management of life itself (to adopt Rose’s terminology) through the 
creation of categories supported by statistics becomes a particularly powerful 
tool in the CEAS. The creation of categories of asylum seekers whose claims to 
protection never need to be heard because they belong to groups excluded 
from consideration is a cornerstone of the CEAS. The categories are defined on 
the basis of the Member States assessment of third countries and countries of 
origin. The asylum seeker is excluded from influencing the assessment in any 
substantive manner. The life of the individual asylum seeker is managed 
through the State’s categorization of his or her state of origin or some state 
through which he or she passed en route, supported by statistics about the inci-
dence of human rights violations there. The individual’s capacity to escape the 
category and to be entitled to differentiation is denied or impaired irrepara-
bly. The individual is subsumed, possibly fatally, into a category deemed safe 
for expulsion. 
The CEAS reveals the three techniques of governmentality at work simulta-
neously. The analytical framework of governmentality indicates some deep 
flaws in the CEAS as a system which claims to provide international protection 
to those who need it. 
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